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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
III ii in, ( i l l AJIJI .11 T 
vs. 
VAL GEORGE TEHERO, 
Defendant Appellant. 
Case No. 20050586-CA 
U R I H I ' U I ' ki i I;I,I,M<; 
.It K i M J K i i O A A L M A * LME.N 1 
Defendant appeals a conviction for Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
third degree felony, in \ luluiioii ul Ulan L ode Ann. vj :^-^ ,• -;n~)(,a)u) v'v\ est-004J, in 
the <^ f V , h -» ,. IT 
Pamela G. Heffernan presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to consider the petition 
pursuant to Utah Code Aiin >• "8--a-Ji-Hci (West 20U4j. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSIK ;. ; 
defend:i;i:"; nrv 
encounter? 
iiw- u U i i CO urt properly admit drug evidence seized incident to 
*<{:>ndin^ w 1 , , : 
Issue 2: Alternatively, even assuming the initial encounter was not voluntary, 
did the trial court properly admit the drug evidence because the arresting officer 
properly detained defendant after determining that the bicycle, which had no front or 
rear lighting, was unsafe? 
Standard of Review for Both Issues: This Court reviews the factual findings 
underlying a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress for clear error. The trial 
court's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake City v. 
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, \ 11, 998 P.2d 274 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated.. . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1110 (West 2005 Supp.) 
Bicycle and moped inspections—At request of officer 
A peace officer may at any time require a person riding a bicycle or 
moped to stop and submit the bicycle or moped to an inspection and a test as 
appropriate if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that: 
(1) the bicycle or moped is unsafe or not equipped as required by law; or 
(2) the bicycle or moped's equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine). R. 6. Defendant was referred to drug 
2 
court. iv. 20. He missed drug screening tests on October 2 and 85 2004. R. 25, 27. 
Then he failed to appear for a hearing and the court issued, a bench warrant'on 
Octobc: iv. — t .. . .. , ^ . *. \ - .-. t. ,.wiw:iuii... • .;> u ; ^ . ; .;:L-ti I- * :i 
CP.:LI C : " . . - . • ;,, -.- • . ' .." ' " ' . . • ... • " . " 
On January 28,2005, defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum 
in Support I hereo; * , wwiu>n ^ .v*pprebb ) , ciaimnu n..;i u.^ ^cmaiiipi^ia.iii^ .i.:J 
been seized. ::l..i iring a n illegal search R , 19 50 . .••-. •' .' ••.- . .
 :.. .'. -'.' "
 :
" 
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress, See Transcript, dated 
February 22, 2UU:. IN *• -T. Addendum A. w/i A r , d .. . _' :.:J a\a; w ^ n ^yjed 
t - •" , . ,J ••• •*. * *V N' • " '-~ ^:>rr,,:N\ See 
Transcript, dated April 12,2005 ("Findings and. Conclusions' . \< : 11. \ddendum B. 
On April _-. _ww.-. uc^iiciuni p id .^d
 ri.«. * ^ possession of 
methai *;v\..•/':' r i^ ^- ] ; : •! • *''* ' Motion to 
Suppress. R. 85-87. 
The trial court sentenced delcndant to zero to five years in prison, but 
suspended the prison tei iii a rid ordered defendant to sei v e 72 da.) s in ja il followed by 
36 months of probation. R. 90-91. 
Defendant timely appealed, x.-, 3. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bike bust 
Ogden City Police Officer Kenneth Hammond was in his squad car on routine 
patrol about 10:30 p.m. when he saw defendant riding a bicycle in the dark without 
proper lighting. R. 104:4, 6. Officer Hammond decided to investigate. R. 104:7. 
Officer Hammond pulled into a driveway and stopped about 15 feet behind the 
defendant. R. 104:8, 10. Officer Hammond did not activate his overhead lights or 
takedown lights. R. 104:10. Nor did he indicate to defendant that he wanted him to 
stop. Id. Nonetheless, defendant turned, noticed the officer and stopped. Id. 
Officer Hammond got out of his car and approached defendant. Id. He did not 
draw his gun or remove handcuffs from his belt. Id. He did not touch the defendant. 
R. 104:11. Rather, he merely asked defendant for identification. Id. Defendant had 
no identification, but stated that his name was Val Tehero. Id. 
Using a portable radio, Officer Hammond contacted dispatch and requested a 
warrants check for defendant. R. 104:11-12. The warrants check took between 20 
seconds and two minutes. R. 104:13. During that time, Officer Hammond was not 
blocking defendant's way and did nothing to prevent the defendant from leaving. R. 
104:15-16. Defendant made no attempt to leave. R. 104:15. 
Upon learning defendant had a warrant for his arrest, Officer Hammond placed 
him in handcuffs. R. 104:16. A search incident to the arrest revealed that defendant 
was in possession of a baggy containing a crystal substance. R. 104:17. Officer 
4 
Hammond estimated that about three minutes elapsed between the time he 
approached defendant and the time he placed him in handcuffs. R. 104:16. 
Motion to Suppress 
In his Motion to Suppress, defendant claimed that Officer Hammond had 
no reason to stop and detain him because Utah law does not require lighting on 
bicycles ridden on sidewalks. R. 49-50. Thus, defendant claimed that the 
methamphetamine was seized during an unlawful detention and the evidence must 
be suppressed. Id. 
The State responded by pointing out that although Officer Hammond may 
have believed he was justified in stopping defendant because he was riding at 
night without proper lighting, the encounter with the defendant was entirely 
consensual and, therefore, was not a "seizure" as that term has been defined by the 
United States Supreme Court. R. 54-58. 
The trial court heard arguments on April 5, 2005, and issued an oral ruling 
on April 12, 2005. The trial court's Findings and Conclusions are as follows: 
• "Although the officer pulled up behind Mr. Tehero, who was operating 
his bicycle at a late evening hours [sic] on the—on the sidewalk, he did not 
activate his lights, he didn't activate his siren, he didn't tell the defendant to stop, 
he didn't indicate in any way that he was detaining the defendant." R. 111:2. 
• The defendant saw Officer Hammond and voluntarily stopped his bike. Id. 
• Officer Hammond "[d]idn't take his [defendant's] driver's license, his 
identification card, or any other property belonging to the defendant. R. I l l :4. 
• Officer Hammond asked defendant his name. R. 111:2. 
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• Before his arrest, the defendant was free to leave. R. 111:4. 
• A reasonable person would have known he was free to leave. Id. 
• The encounter between Officer Hammond and defendant was voluntary 
and never escalated to a "level two situation." R. 111:2. 
• The Motion to Suppress is denied. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The encounter between defendant and Officer Hammond was 
consensual. Defendant was free to leave at any time and Officer Hammond did 
nothing to suggest otherwise. Officer Hammond was justified in asking defendant 
his name, checking for warrants and arresting defendant on an outstanding 
warrant. Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied the Motion to Suppress. 
Point II: Even assuming arguendo that the encounter was a so-called 
"level two" stop, Officer Hammond had probable cause to stop defendant because 
defendant was riding his bicycle at night without proper lighting. Because the stop 
was lawful, Officer Hammond was justified in briefly detaining defendant to 
check for warrants. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motion to 
suppress drugs seized from defendant during a lawful search incident to arrest. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S ENCOUNTER WITH OFFICER 
HAMMOND WAS ENTIRELY VOLUNTARY AND, 
THEREFORE, REQUIRED NO JUSTIFICATION 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
Defendant claims he was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes from the 
moment Officer Hammond got out of his vehicle and "t[ook] that step" toward 
defendant. Br. Aplt. at 8. Defendant is incorrect. 
In accord with Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), and its progeny, Utah's 
appellate courts recognize three different levels of police-citizen encounters. State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 
986 (Utah App. 1994). So-called "level one" encounters, in which the citizen 
voluntarily answers the police officer's questions, require no Fourth Amendment 
justification. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). "Level two" encounters 
occur when the interaction between the officer and citizen is no longer voluntary. Id. 
at 434; Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617. In order to detain a citizen against his or her will, 
the officer must have "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime. Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617. However, the "'detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984)). A 
"level three" encounter—arrest—requires "'probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or is being committed.'" Id. at 618 (quoting Merritt, 736 F.2d at 
230). 
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Many if not most police/citizen encounters begin—and end—as voluntary 
interaction in which the citizen is free to leave at any time. Deitman, 739 P.2d at 
617; Bean, 869 P.2d at 986; State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); see also State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 
(Utah 1994) ("Not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen is a 
seizure"). "[A] seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment does not occur 
when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street and questions 
him, if the person is willing to listen." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah 
App.1987) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)); accord Deitman, 739 P.2d 
at 617; Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. This questioning may even be incriminating and 
include a request for identification and for consent to search. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 
435, 439. An officer may stop and question an individual at any time so long as a 
"reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police and go about his 
business.'" Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (quoting California v. HodariD., 499 U.S. 621, 
628(1991)). 
Relevant factors in determining whether an encounter is nonconsensual include 
an officer's use of physical force, display of a weapon or a show of authority for 
purposes of restraining the individual's liberty. Bean, 869 P.2d at 987. Another 
significant factor is whether the officer retains the citizen's driver's license or other 
documents while checking for warrants because "a reasonable person would not feel 
free to leave." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, HI 1, 998 P.2d 274. 
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Until the warrants check came back positive, defendant had been free to leave. 
As Officer Hammond pulled his squad car behind defendant, Officer Hammond did 
not activate his overhead lights, takedown lights or siren. R. 104:10. He did not even 
ask defendant to stop; defendant noticed the squad car and stopped of his own accord. 
Id. Officer Hammond approached defendant and requested identification. In doing so, 
he did not draw his weapon or use a commanding tone of voice. R. 104:11. He was 
alone; he did not summon additional officers. R. 104:10. 
Importantly, Officer Hammond never obtained a driver's license or other 
important documents from defendant, R. 104:11, which would likely have prevented 
defendant from leaving and escalated the encounter to level two. Ray, 2000 UT App 
5 5 at Tf 11. When Officer Hammond requested identification, defendant stated that he 
had none, but gave his name as "Val Tehero." R. 104:11. Using a portable radio, 
Officer Hammond requested a warrant check. R. 104:12. Within seconds, or at most 
two minutes, Officer Hammond learned there was a warrant for defendant's arrest. R. 
104:13, 16. Officer Hammond then had probable cause to believe defendant had 
committed a crime and properly placed him under arrest. 
In sum, prior to defendant's arrest, the encounter was entirely voluntary. 
Accordingly, there was no Fourth Amendment violation and the trial court properly 
denied the motion to suppress. 
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II. OFFICER HAMMOND HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
STOP THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE HIS BICYCLE HAD 
NO FRONT OR REAR LIGHTING. 
Even assuming arguendo that the encounter was not consensual, Officer 
Hammond had probable cause to stop defendant because he was riding his bicycle at 
night without front and rear lights. 
"[A] stop is lawful if incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' 
presence." State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990); see also State v. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1993). "An observed traffic violation gives the 
officer 'at the least, probable cause to believe the citizen had committed a traffic 
offense.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 n.2 
(Utah App. 1989)); accord State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995). 
An officer may legally stop a vehicle whenever he suspects "that the 'driver is 
violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations.'" 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)). 
This is because "police officers are under a duty to enforce the traffic laws." Id. at 
1135. 
These principles apply equally to bicycle safety violations. See, e.g., State v. 
Cartwright, 2000 WL 125930 (Ohio App.) (Addendum C) (officers had probable 
cause to stop bicyclist and check for warrants after they observed violation of bicycle 
safety statute); Thomas v. State, 614 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1993) (applying Fourth 
Amendment search-and-seizure principles to bicycles). In Utah, police officers have 
10 
explicit statutory authorization to stop bicyclists if the officer reasonably believes the 
bicycle is unsafe. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-l 110(1) (West 2005 Supp.) ("A peace 
officer may at any time require a person riding a bicycle or moped to stop and submit 
the bicycle or moped to an inspection and a test as appropriate if the officer has 
reasonable cause to believe that:... the bicycle or moped is unsafe or not equipped as 
required by law;.. .") (emphasis added). 
Officer Hammond testified that he stopped defendant because it was 10:30 
p.m. and the bicycle had no lights on the front or rear. R. 104:7. Utah law requires 
that a bicycle be equipped with a front headlamp and a taillight (or rear reflector) 
visible from at least 500 feet in either direction. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-l 116(1) 
(West 2005 Supp.). Front and rear lighting must be activated "at the times described 
in Section 41-6a-1603," i.e., "at any time from a half hour after sunset to a half hour 
before sunrise . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-l 116(1) & § 41-6a-1603 (West 2005 
Supp.). 
On cross-examination, Officer Hammond acceded to defendant's claim that 
the statute requiring lighting on bicycles did not apply when the cyclist was riding on 
the sidewalk, as defendant was in this case. R. 104:21. In fact, the statute regulating 
the use of bicycles on sidewalks is subject to a different interpretation. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-61-1106(5) (West 2005 Supp.) states that a cyclist riding on a sidewalk "has all the 
rights and duties applicable to a pedestrian under the same circumstances." Defendant 
apparently reads "all the rights and duties applicable to a pedestrian" to mean that the cyclist 
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riding on a sidewalk has only the rights and duties of a pedestrian and no more. See R. 50 
(defendant's Motion to Suppress). But it is not necessary or even prudent to read the 
provision so narrowly. Simply because a cyclist has the rights and duties of a pedestrian 
does not necessarily mean a cyclist may not also have additional rights and duties. For 
instance, the safety rationale for requiring bicycles to have lights when riding on the highway 
after dark would also apply when the cyclist is on a sidewalk. Other bicycle safety 
provisions also seem applicable and beneficial regardless of whether the cyclist is on a 
roadway or sidewalk. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-l 103(1) (West 2005 Supp.) 
(bicycle may not carry more people than it is designed to carry); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-
1112(1) (West 2005 Supp.) (bicyclist "may not carry any package, bundle, or article which 
prevents the use of both hands in the control and operation" of bicycle). Thus, a more 
reasonable and cogent interpretation of the bicycle regulations indicates that defendant was 
required to have proper lighting on his bicycle at night even while riding on the sidewalk. 
In any event, Officer Hammond was authorized to stop defendant under Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6a-l 110(1), which allows a peace officer to stop and inspect a 
bicycle if he or she suspects it to be unsafe. Thus, Officer Hammond was justified in 
stopping defendant because he had probable cause, or at least reasonable suspicion, to 
believe defendant was riding a bicycle that was unsafe because it had no front or rear 
lighting. See, e.g., Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (an officer may effect a stop whenever he 
suspects "that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic 
and equipment regulations555) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 
(1979)); see also State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 19,112 P.3d 507 (where facts and 
12 
inferences from facts support reasonable suspicion, officer's failure to "connect[] his 
own testimonial dots" will not negate reasonable suspicion). 
In sum, even assuming defendant was "detained" when he stopped his bicycle 
after noticing Officer Hammond behind him—an assumption not supported by the 
facts or relevant law, which demonstrate the encounter was consensual1—the stop 
was warranted because the officer had at least reasonable suspicion to believe 
defendant was riding a bicycle that was unsafe because it had no front or rear lights. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of March, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
See Point I, above. 
Even though this argument differs from the rationale given by the trial court 
in denying the motion to suppress, this Court may reach it as an alternative ground for 
affirmance "apparent on the record." See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, TflO, 52 P.3d 
1158. 
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I hereby certify that on the 27m day of March, 2006 I caused to be U.S. Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-k ~k -k ~k -k 1 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
PLAINTIFF, ) ^0L 13 2005 
VS. ) VIDEO TRANSCRIPT 
VAL GEORGE TEHERO, ) CASE NO. 041905050 
DEFENDANT. ) 
-k -k k k -k 1 
i fer ^ 1 
^ c* I 
SUPPRESSION HEARING — S?l 
FEBRUARY 22, 2005 ° 1 ^ 
CS> — 1 
HONORABLE PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN g? 2] 
en • 
Vr -k ~k -k -k 1 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE STATE: BRENDA J. BEATON 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: MARTIN V. GRAVIS 
***** 
FILED 1 
REPORTED/TRANSCRIBED BY DEAN OLSEN, CSR UTAH APPELLATE COUnl 
2525 GRANT AVENUE j|J| J 5 2005 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
(801) 395-1056 , ^ 
rmiGiNAi 2flGGO08fcr6A 
2 
INDEX 
OFFICER HAMMOND 
DIRECT EXAMINATION P . 3 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 14 
DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTD 15 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 19 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 2 6 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 28 
-k -k -k -k -k 
OGDEN, UTAH FEBRUARY 2 2 , 2 0 0 5 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THIS I S THE TIME FOR A HEARING 
ON A MOTION TO SUPPRESS IN THE STATE OF UTAH VERSUS VAL 
TEHERO, CASE 4 1 9 0 5 0 5 0 . THE STATE READY TO PROCEED? 
MS. BEATON: WE ARE, YOUR HONOR. THE CONVERSATION THAT 
I HAD WITH MR. GRAVIS WAS WE WERE GONNA PUT ON THE 
EVIDENTIARY PORTION TODAY AND THEN CONTINUE I T FOR ORAL 
ARGUMENT ON ANOTHER DAY. 
THE COURT: I S THAT RIGHT? 
MR. GRAVIS: YES, YOUR HONOR. THE STATE HAD NOT FILED 
THEIR RESPONSE, AND I THOUGHT I T WOULD BE BETTER TO PUT ON 
THE EVIDENCE TODAY BEFORE WE GOT - -
THE COURT: WHY DON'T — WHY DON'T WE SEE I F YOU CHANGE 
YOUR MIND AFTER YOU HEAR I T , OKAY? OR ARE YOU CERTAIN THAT 
THAT'S — I JUST — WHEN WOULD YOU WANNA RESCHEDULE IT FOR? 
3 
I KNOW YOU'RE GONNA BE GONE FOR A WHILE, SO — 
MS. BEATON: RIGHT. I JUST NEED ENOUGH TIME TO WRITE 
SOMETHING UP AND THEN — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MS. BEATON: — FOR US TO HAVE THE ORAL ARGUMENT, SO WE 
COULD PROBABLY EVEN PUT IT ON A REGULAR CALENDAR IF YOU'D 
LIKE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, LET'S GO AHEAD ANYWAY. 
MS. BEATON: OKAY. THE STATE CALLS OFFICER HAMMOND. 
OFICER HAMMOND, 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED 
AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BEATON: 
Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND OCCUPATION. 
A. OFFICER HAMMOND. POLICE OFFICER, OGDEN CITY. 
Q. OFFICER HAMMOND, HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED FOR THE OGDEN 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT? 
A. OVER FOUR YEARS NOW. 
Q. AND WHAT DO YOU DO FOR OGDEN CITY? 
A. PATROL OFFICER. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. WERE YOU WORKING PATROL ON AUGUST 31ST, 
2004? 
A. YES, MA'AM. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AT APPROXIMATELY 10:30 AT NIGHT, WHAT WERE 
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YOU DOING AT THE TIME? 
A. JUST ROUTINE PATROL. 
Q. OKAY. AND WHEN YOU SAY ROUTINE PATROL, DOES MEAN THAT 
YOU WERE IN A UNIFORM THAT EVENING? 
A. YES, MA'AM. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AND WERE YOU DRIVING A MARKED POLICE 
VEHICLE? 
A. I WAS. 
Q. AND WHERE WERE YOU DRIVING AT ABOUT 10:30 AT NIGHT? 
A. SOUTHBOUND ON WASHINGTON BOULEVARD ABOUT AROUND 17TH 
STREET. 
Q. OKAY. IF WE COULD JUST DIAGRAM THIS GENERAL AREA IN 
WHICH THIS INCIDENT HAPPENED. (UNINTELLIGIBLE) DRAWING. 
OKAY. SO ON THE DIAGRAM, NORTH — 
A. NORTH'D BE POINTING UP — 
Q. — UP IN THIS DIRECTION. 
A. THIS WILL — 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
AND 
THIS 
OKAY 
THE 
ACROSS. 
— 
'LL BE 17TH STREET 
• 
INTERSECTION, I MEAN 
IT CANTS A LITTLE 
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD. 
Q. OKAY 
INCIDENT 
. WHERE WERE 
HAPPENED? 
YOU 
THIS 
IT'S 
BIT ON ' 
DRIVING 
IS 
NOT 
L7TH 
AT 
WASHINGTON. 
EXACTLY STRAIGHT 
STREET GOING 
THE TIME THAT 
THROUGH 
THIS 
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A. LET'S SEE, WELL, THIS — THIS WILL BE 1700 WASHINGTON, 
THIS'LL BE 1600 WASHINGTON WITH THIS BEING 17TH STREET. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. WANT ME TO MOVE JUST A LITTLE BIT? 
MR. GRAVIS: THAT'S OKAY. 
THE WITNESS: OKAY. I WAS DRIVING SOUTHBOUND ON 
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) OKAY. AND AT THE TIME THAT YOU'RE 
DRIVING SOUTHBOUND ON WASHINGTON BOULEVARD, DID YOU SEE 
ANYBODY IN THE STREET? ANYWHERE IN THAT AREA? 
A. I DID. 
Q. OKAY. AND ABOUT WHAT TIME OF DAY OR NIGHT IS THIS? 
A. ABOUT 10:30 AT NIGHT. 
Q. OKAY. IS IT DARK AT THAT TIME? 
A. IT IS. THERE WERE STREET LIGHTS. 
Q. WERE THERE OTHER PEOPLE IN THE AREA THAT WERE OUT ON THE 
STREET AT THIS TIME? 
A. NORMAL VEHICULAR TRAFFIC. 
Q. IS THIS YOUR PATROL (UNINTELLIGIBLE)? 
A. IT IS. 
Q. OKAY. SO AS YOU'RE DRIVING SOUTHBOUND THEN, WHO DO YOU 
SEE OUT IN THE STREET AREA? 
A. THERE'S A ~ THERE'S A SIDEWALK LIKE SO. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. THIS — 
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Q- AND YOU'RE SHOWING ON THE 16TH — THE 1700 — 
A. YEAH, CORRECT. 
Q. — BLOCK, SEVEN — 1600 BLOCK. 
A. THIS IS THE OLD PEPSI BUILDING THAT'S NOW — I DON'T 
KNOW WHAT IT IS NOW, BUT IT WAS THE OLD PEPSI BUILDING. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. I NOTICED A MALE RIDING A BICYCLE BASICALLY JUST RIGHT 
IN FRONT OF THE PEPSI BUILDING. 
Q. OKAY. NORTHBOUND OR SOUTHBOUND? 
A. NORTHBOUND. 
Q. OKAY. SO THE INDIVIDUAL ON THE BIKE, YOU NOTICED THE 
MALE. DID YOU RECOGNIZE THAT MALE? 
A. NO (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
Q. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THE MALE IN THE COURTROOM? 
A. I DO. 
Q. WHERE IS HE SEATED? 
A. THE DEFENDANT. 
Q. OKAY. LET THE RECORD SHOW HE'S IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT 
IN THIS CASE. YOU SEE THE DEFENDANT RIDING A BICYCLE. IS HE 
WITH ANYONE? 
A. NO. HE'S ALONE. 
Q. OKAY. AND WHERE DID HE RIDE HIS BIKE? 
A. JUST CONTINUED ON NORTHBOUND ON THE CROSSWALK, ACROSS — 
THROUGH THE INTERSECTION AT 17TH AND WASHINGTON, BACK UP THE 
SIDEWALK INTO THE 1600 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON. 
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Q. OKAY. DID HE CONTINUE TO RIDE HIS BIKE THE ENTIRE TIME? 
A. HE DID. 
Q. WERE YOU CONCERNED AT ALL ABOUT THE DEFENDANT RIDING HIS 
BIKE IN THIS AREA? 
A. YES, THERE — THERE'S A LOT OF — THERE'S A LOT OF FOOT 
TRAFFIC, LOT OF VEHICLE -- OR NOT — BICYCLE TRAFFIC IN THAT 
AREA. IT'S ~ IT'S A HIGH CRIME AREA. THERE'S A LOT OF 
MOTELS IN THAT AREA, LOT OF DRUG USE IN THAT PARTICULAR AREA. 
Q. SO DID YOU SUSPECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS VIOLATING SOME 
PARTICULAR STATUTE — 
A. I DID — 
Q. — B Y RIDING HIS BIKE AT THIS TIME OF NIGHT? 
A. I DID. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU THINK THAT HE WAS VIOLATING? 
A. BY HIM ENTERING THE ROADWAY HERE. 
Q. ON 17TH — 
A. ON 17TH STREET ACROSS — OR CROSSING THE INTERSECTION. 
PAST DUSK, A BIKE IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE A LIGHT ON FRONT AND 
REAR — 
Q. OKAY. 
A. --OF THE BIKE. 
Q. AND THAT WAS YOUR CONCERN. 
A. YES. 
Q. OKAY. SO DID THE DEFENDANT CONTINUE TO RIDE NORTHBOUND 
THEN UP INTO THE 1600 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON BOULEVARD? 
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A. YES, HE DID. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU DECIDE TO DO? 
A. I — LIKE I SAID, I WAS TRAVELING SOUTHBOUND. EXCUSE 
ME. I MADE A U-TURN WHEN IT WAS SAFE TO HEAD NORTHBOUND ON 
WASHINGTON. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. THERE WAS — LIKE I SAID, THERE'S A RENTAL COMPANY IN 
THE 1600 BLOCK — WELL, THERE'S A MORTUARY OR A FUNERAL HOME, 
MORTUARY RIGHT HERE, AND THEN JUST TO THE NORTH OF THAT, 
THERE'S THE RENTAL YARD. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. THEY HAVE A FENCE AND A DRIVEWAY RIGHT HERE. I TURNED 
INTO THAT DRIVEWAY. IT KIND OF GOES ACROSS THE SIDEWALK. 
KIND OF OFF TRAFFIC SO I WASN'T STICKING INTO TRAFFIC. BY 
THIS TIME, THE PERSON ON THE BICYCLE WAS — 
Q. FARTHER — 
A. -- FURTHER — FURTHER NORTH THAN ME. 
Q. OKAY. SO WHEN YOU -- WHEN YOU PULL IN THEN, DO YOU DO 
ANYTHING BY PULLING INTO THIS PARKING AREA NEXT TO THIS 
RENTAL COMPANY THAT OBSTRUCTS THE DEFENDANT FROM CONTINUING 
ON WHAT APPEARS TO BE HIS ROUTE WHICH IS NORTHBOUND? 
A. NO. I PULL — I PULLED BEHIND HIM. 
Q. OKAY. SO WHY DON'T YOU GIVE ME AN IDEA AS TO — WHY 
DON'T YOU MARK YOUR CAR IN BLUE AND THEN MARK APPROXIMATELY 
WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS WHEN YOU PULLED INTO THIS DRIVEWAY 
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AREA. 
A. OKAY. HERE'S THE LARGE — FROM THE SIDEWALK TO THE 
STREET, IT'S — THERE'S THIS (UNINTELLIGIBLE) LIGHT. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. I PULLED UP AND — 
THE COURT: CAN YOU MOVE OVER SO I CAN — 
THE WITNESS: OH, I'M SORRY, MA'AM. 
THE COURT: -- SEE A LITTLE BIT? OKAY. THANK YOU. 
THE WITNESS: I PULLED UP INTO THIS AREA HERE — 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) WERE YOU — 
A. — VEHICLE FACING — 
Q. — IN — WERE YOU OFF THE ROAD IN THE DRIVEWAY AREA? 
A. YES. THERE WAS MAYBE TWO FEET OF MY VEHICLE STILL ON — 
ON WASHINGTON BOULEVARD. 
Q. IS IT ONE OF THOSE ROADS THAT YOU COULD PARK OUT ON THE 
STREET? 
A. ON, YEAH. PEOPLE PARK ALONG THE CURBLINE ALL THE TIME. 
Q. OKAY. SO YOU'RE NOT OBSTRUCTING — 
A. NO. 
Q. -- TRAFFIC OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. 
A. NO. 
Q. AND THEN IN RED, WHERE WOULD THE DEFENDANT HAVE BEEN ON 
HIS BIKE? 
A. HE WAS — THE SIDEWALK'S STILL HERE. HE WAS IN THIS 
AREA — IN THIS AREA HERE. 
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1 Q. OKAY. APPROXIMATELY COULD YOU GIVE US AN IDEA AS TO 
2 ABOUT WHAT THE DISTANCE IS BETWEEN WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS 
3 FROM WHERE YOUR CAR WAS LOCATED? 
4 A. TEN, 15 FEET FURTHER NORTH THAN MY CAR. 
5 Q. OKAY. AND WHEN — YOU CAN GO AHEAD AND HAVE A SEAT. 
6 WHEN YOU — DID YOU ACTIVATE YOUR LIGHTS AND SIRENS? 
7 A. NO, I DID NOT. 
8 Q. DID YOU EITHER MAKE ANY KIND OF HAND GESTURE OR ANY 
9 STATEMENT TO THE DEFENDANT THAT YOU WANTED HIM TO STOP? 
10 A. NO. HE LOOKED BACK AND NOTICED ME PULLING IN — 
11 Q. AND HOW — 
12 A. — AND STOPPED. 
13 Q. THE DEFENDANT JUST STOPPED ON HIS OWN. 
14 A. YES. 
15 Q. OKAY. DID YOU DO ANYTHING TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO CONTINUE 
16 TO REMAIN WHERE HE WAS? 
17 A. NO. I ACTUALLY APPROACHED HIM. 
18 Q. OKAY. NOW, WHEN YOU APPROACHED HIM THEN, DID YOU — DID 
19 YOU PULL YOUR GUN AT ANY POINT, GET OUT ANY HANDCUFFS? 
20 A. NO. 
21 Q. ALL RIGHT. AT ANY POINT IN TIME DID ANY OTHER OFFICERS 
22 COME TO THE SCENE TO BACK YOU UP? 
23 A. NO. 
24 Q. SO IT'S JUST — ARE YOU THE ONLY PERSON IN YOUR CAR? 
25 A. YES, MA'AM. 
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Q. ALL RIGHT. SO WHEN YOU GET OUT OF YOUR CAR THEN, DID 
YOU WALK DIRECTLY OVER TO THE DEFENDANT? 
A. YES. 
Q. DID YOU EVER LAY HANDS ON THE DEFENDANT OR TOUCH HIM IN 
ANY FASHION? 
A. NO. 
Q. OKAY. WHEN YOU APPROACHED THE DEFENDANT, WHAT DID YOU 
SAY TO HIM? 
A. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD SOME IDENTIFICATION. 
Q. AND HOW DID THE DEFENDANT RESPOND? 
A. HE JUST IDENTIFIED HIMSELF HAS VAL TEHERO. 
Q. OKAY. DID HE TELL YOU WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD ANY KIND OF 
IDENTIFICATION CARD OR DRIVER'S LICENSE ON HIM? 
A. NO. 
Q. HE DIDN'T HAVE ONE? 
A. (WITNESS SHAKES HEAD.) 
Q. OKAY. AT THE TIME THAT YOU FIRST HAD THIS CONVERSATION 
WITH THE DEFENDANT, DO YOU EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT YOU SUSPECT 
THAT HE MAY BE VIOLATING THE BICYCLE STATUTES OR DO YOU HAVE 
ANY CONVERSATION AS TO HIM — AS TO WHY YOU'D ACTUALLY TURNED 
AROUND AND STOPPED? 
A. I — I DON'T BELIEVE WE HAD THAT CONVERSATION. I ASKED 
HIM FOR HIS — I ASKED HIM WHO HE — OR FOR IDENTIFICATION. 
HE IDENTIFIED HIMSELF. AND THEN AT THAT POINT, DID JUST MY 
STANDARD ROUTINE, CHECKING FOR WARRANTS. 
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1 Q. OKAY. AND WHEN YOU SAY YOU CHECKED HIM FOR WARRANTS, 
2 DID THAT REQUIRE YOU TO ACTUALLY GO BACK TO YOUR CAR? 
3 A. I — WE DO IT OVER OUR POLICE RADIO. 
4 Q. OKAY. AND YOU'RE POINTING TO A RADIO THAT YOU'RE 
5 WEARING ON YOUR UNIFORM? 
6 A. YES, MA'AM. 
7 Q. SO THIS IS SOMETHING THAT YOU WERE WEARING THAT 
8 PARTICULAR EVENING? 
9 A. EXACTLY AS I'M DRESSED NOW. 
10 Q. SO WHEN YOU APPROACH THE DEFENDANT AND YOU ASK HIM FOR 
11 THIS AND HE GIVES YOU HIS NAME, DO YOU NEED ANYTHING OTHER 
12 THAN HIS NAME IN ORDER TO RUN HIM FOR WARRANTS? 
13 A. NO. 
14 Q. ALL RIGHT. DID YOU EVER HAVE TO LEAVE THE DEFENDANT 
15 THEN WHILE THIS PROCESS WAS TAKING PLACE? 
16 A. NO. 
17 Q. WHEN YOU ACTUALLY REQUEST A WARRANTS CHECK, WHAT DO YOU 
18 HAVE TO DO? 
19 A. IT — ON THE RADIO DIAL HERE --
20 Q. IT'S A RADIO THAT YOU WEAR ON YOUR WAIST? 
21 A. YES. WE OPERATE ~ THERE'S — THERE'S 15 DIFFERENT 
22 CHANNELS ON THIS RADIO. WE OPERATE ON CHANNEL 1. IF WE 
23 WANNA CHECK DRIVER'S LICENSE, WARRANTS, ANYTHING LIKE THAT, 
24 WE SIMPLY SWITCH THIS LITTLE DIAL SEVEN TIMES TO CHANNEL 8, 
25 GOING FROM CHANNEL 1 TO CHANNEL 8, IT TAKES ABOUT ONE SECOND 
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TO DO. ADVISE THE DISPATCHER WHAT WE'RE REQUESTING. IN THIS 
CASE IT WOULD BE FOR A WARRANTS CHECK. THE DISPATCHER 
REPLIES THAT SHE -- OR SHE — SHE REPLIES BACK THAT SHE'S 
READY TO — FOR ME TO GIVE HER THE INFORMATION. I GIVE HER 
THE NAME AND SHE RUNS A WARRANTS CHECK. 
Q. OKAY. SO ABOUT HOW LONG DOES THIS PROCESS TAKE THEN TO 
GET A WARRANTS CHECK? 
A. I WOULD SAY ANYWHERE BETWEEN ABOUT 20 SECONDS AND NOT 
MORE THAN AT THE FURTHEST EXTREME TWO MINUTES. 
Q. OKAY. WHAT CAUSES A DELAY IN RETURNING INFORMATION ON A 
WARRANTS CHECK? 
A. DEPENDING ON HOW MANY OFFICERS ARE WORKING AT THE TIME. 
FRIDAY, SATURDAYS — THURSDAY, FRIDAY, SATURDAY NIGHTS TEND 
TO BE A LITTLE BIT BUSIER, MORE OFFICER, MORE PE ~ MORE 
OFFICERS RUNNING INFORMATION. THIS WAS ON A TUESDAY NIGHT. 
THERE'S ONLY 16 OFFICERS WORKING. GENERALLY, TUESDAYS ARE A 
LITTLE BIT SLOWER. WE ONLY HAVE, LIKE I SAID, THERE'S ONLY 
TWO SQUADS ON, SO 16 OFFICERS. AT THAT POINT IN TIME, THE 
SERVICE CHANNEL, HER ONLY SOLE PURPOSE IS TO RUN INFORMATION 
FOR US SO WE DON'T TIE UP OUR PRIMARY CHANNEL. 
Q. ON THIS PARTICULAR EVENING, DO YOU RECALL WHAT, YOU 
KNOW, KIND OF RADIO TRAFFIC THERE WAS? 
A. IT WAS LIGHT. I MEAN NORMAL — IT WASN'T EVEN NORMAL. 
Q. IS THERE ANYTHING ABOUT THE DEFENDANT'S LAST NAME WHICH 
WOULD INDICATE TO YOU THAT THIS WARRANTS CHECK WOULD BE 
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FASTER THAN OTHERS? 
A. YES. WHEN YOU RUN A WARRANTS CHECK, IT PULLS UP 
ALPHABETICALLY THE CLOSEST NAME THAT WE RAN DOWN. IF WE WERE 
TO RUN JOHN SMITH, A COMMON NAME, THERE WOULD BE A LOT — 
MR. GRAVIS: YOUR HONOR, I'M GONNA OBJECT. I DON'T KNOW 
WHERE THIS IS GOING. HE CAN TESTIFY HOW LONG THIS WARRANT 
CHECK TAKE — 
THE COURT: YEAH — 
MR. GRAVIS: — IF HE HAS — IF HE CAN REMEMBER, BUT — 
MS. BEATON: I THINK WHAT I'M GETTING AT IS, DO YOU 
THINK THIS IS CLOSER TO THE 20-SECOND MARK OR DO YOU THINK 
IT'S CLOSER TO THE TWO-MINUTE MARK, AND I'M HAVING HIM 
EXPLAIN WHY HE THINKS IT'S CLOSER TO 20 SECONDS THAT HE WAS 
STANDING THERE. I THINK IT MAKES A DIFFERENCE AS TO WHETHER 
OR NOT — THE COURT IS GONNA DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THIS IS 
JUST A POLICE ENCOUNTER WITH A CITIZEN ON THE STREET OR 
WHETHER OR NOT IT'S GONNA BE SOMETHING MORE EXTENDED IN TERMS 
A DETENTION OR SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE. 
MR. GRAVIS: MAY I VOIR DIRE THE WITNESS? 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER HOW LONG IT TOOK THAT NIGHT? 
A. IT WAS A VERY SHORT TIME. 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER HOW LONG? 
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A. ACTUAL SECONDS, MINUTES, NO. 
MR. GRAVIS: NOTHING FURTHER. I OBJECT TO THIS LINE OF 
QUESTIONING? IF HE DOESN'T REMEMBER — 
THE COURT: I THINK HE'S TESTIFIED TO HIS RECOLLECTION. 
THAT'S PROBABLY THE BEST EVIDENCE OF WHAT IT IS AND HE SAID A 
SHORT TIME AND HE'S NOT ABLE TO SPECIFY HOW LONG, SO IT — 
IT'S GONNA REQUIRE ME TO SPECULATE WHETHER IT WAS 20 SECONDS 
OR TWO MINUTES, NO MATTER WHAT HE SAYS AT THIS POINT BECAUSE 
GENERAL PRACTICE AND WHAT HAPPENED ON THIS NIGHT MAY NOT HAVE 
BEEN WHAT HAPPENED ON SOME OTHER NIGHT SO, YOU KNOW, I THINK 
IT'S PROBABLY NOT HELPFUL ~ 
MS. BEATON: ALL RIGHT. 
THE COURT: — FOR DETERMINATION. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTD. 
BY MS. BEATON: 
Q. OFFICER HAMMOND, THEN, AS YOU'RE STANDING THERE WAITING 
FOR THIS INFORMATION BACK FROM THE DISPATCHER, DO YOU HAVE A 
CONVERSATION WITH THE DEFENDANT? 
A. NO, THERE WAS NO — THERE WASN'T REALLY A CONVERSATION. 
Q. AT ANY POINT IN TIME WHEN YOU'RE DEALING WITH THE 
DEFENDANT PRIOR TO RECEIVING THE INFORMATION BACK FROM THE 
DISPATCHER, DOES THE DEFENDANT EVER MAKE ANY EFFORT TO LEAVE? 
A. NO. 
Q. DO YOU EVER DO ANYTHING TO PREVENT THE DEFENDANT FROM 
LEAVING? 
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A. NO. 
Q. DOES THE DEFENDANT — YOU'D INDICATED THAT HE HAD A 
BICYCLE. DID THE DEFENDANT EVER GET OFF HIS BICYCLE? 
A. NO. 
Q. DID YOU EVER ASK HIM TO, YOU KNOW, THROW HIS LEG OVER 
THE BAR AND, YOU KNOW, STAND OFF AWAY FROM THE BICYCLE? 
A. NOT UNTIL HE WAS OBVIOUSLY PLACED IN HANDCUFFS — 
Q. OKAY. 
A. — NO. 
Q. SO DURING THIS INITIAL PERIOD OF TIME, HE CONTINUES TO 
SIT ON HIS BICYCLE? 
A. YES, MA'AM. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. DID HE HAVE — DID THE TWO OF YOU EVER HAVE 
A CONVERSATION AS TO WHY YOU WANTED THE DEFENDANT TO REMAIN 
OR DID YOU TELL HIM THAT YOU WANTED HIM TO REMAIN? 
A. I — I ASKED HIM HIS NAME. I RAN FOR THE WARRANTS. I 
FOUND OUT HE HAD A WARRANT. PLACED HIM IN HANDCUFFS. I MEAN 
THERE WASN'T — THERE WASN'T MUCH — IT WAS A VERY SHORT 
TIME. THERE WASN'T AN EXTENDED CONVERSATION. 
Q. ALL TOGETHER BETWEEN THE PERIOD OF TIME WHERE YOU WALK 
UP TO THE DEFENDANT AND THE TIME HE'S PLACED INTO HANDCUFFS, 
HOW LONG WOULD YOU ESTIMATE THAT TOOK? 
A. MAYBE THREE MINUTES TOTAL. 
Q. OKAY. AND IN ADDITION TO THAT PERIOD OF TIME, WHAT ELSE 
DO YOU DO AFTER YOU'VE DETERMINED THAT HE HAS A WARRANT FOR 
17 
HIS ARREST? 
A. PLACED HIM IN HANDCUFFS AND CONDUCTED A SEARCH INCIDENT 
TO ARREST. 
Q. AND DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ON THE DEFENDANT? 
A. I DID. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU FIND? 
A. A CRYSTAL SUBSTANCE IN A BAG. 
Q. OKAY. AND WHAT DID YOU SUSPECT THAT TO BE? 
A. METHAMPHETAMINE. 
Q. IF THE DEFENDANT PRIOR TO THE WARRANTS CHECK WOULD HAVE, 
YOU KNOW, RODE OFF ON HIS BIKE OR MADE ANY EFFORT TO LEAVE, 
WOULD YOU HAVE PERMITTED HIM TO LEAVE AT THAT TIME? 
A. HE WOULD HAVE BEEN — IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A LEVEL ONE 
STOP. WE ASK PEOPLE TO TALK TO US ALL THE TIME AND THEY SAY 
NO, THEY WALK AWAY. AND I WOULDN'T HAVE CHASED HIM, I 
WOULDN'T HAVE TACKLED HIM, ANYTHING LIKE THAT. 
Q. OKAY. SO DID YOU EVER HAVE THAT ACTUAL CONVERSATION, 
DID YOU EVER SAY TO HIM, YOU'RE FREE TO GO IF YOU WANT? 
A. I DID NOT SAY THAT, NO. 
Q. OKAY. BUT DID YOU EVER AT ANY POINT DO ANYTHING TO 
SUGGEST TO HIM THAT HE NEEDED TO REMAIN THERE? 
A. NO. 
Q. NOW, EVEN WHILE YOU'RE RUNNING THE WARRANTS CHECK, DOES 
ANY OFFICER EVEN JUST HAPPEN UPON YOU AND PULL UP? 
A. IT DOES HAPPEN, YES. 
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Q. DID IT HAPPEN IN THIS CASE? 
A. NO. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. SO THE ENTIRE TIME, IT'S JUST YOU AND THE 
DEFENDANT. 
A. YES, MA'AM. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AND THE HANDCUFFS DO NOT COME OUT UNTIL THE 
DEFENDANT IS ACTUALLY — YOU'VE BEEN INFORMED THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAS A WARRANT? 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. THE LIGHTS AND SIRENS ON YOUR CAR, DID YOU 
EVER ACTIVATE THOSE? 
A. NO. 
Q. NOT AT ANY POINT BOTH BEFORE OR AFTER THE DEFENDANT'S 
ARREST? 
A. UH-UH. 
Q. YES OR NO? 
A. NO, I DIDN'T. NO, THEY WERE NEVER ACTIVATED. 
Q. I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS -- OH, YOU KNOW, I DO HAVE 
ONE QUESTION. IN THE REPORT THAT YOU WROTE, ON PARAGRAPH 2 
IT SAYS I STOPPED THE MALE IN THE 1600 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON. 
DID YOU ACTUALLY DO ANYTHING TO STOP THE DEFENDANT — 
A. NO. 
Q. — IN THE 1600 BLOCK? 
A. NO. HE WAS — THERE WAS NO LIGHTS, THERE WAS NO SIRENS, 
THERE WAS NO STOP (UNINTELLIGIBLE). IT WAS NOT A -- IT WAS 
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(UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
Q. WHY DID YOU USE THE WORD STOPPED? 
A. I GUESS FOR A LACK OF BETTER WORDS, HE STOPPED HIS 
MOTION. HE — HE STOPPED. 
Q. AND THAT'S WHAT YOU WERE HOPING WOULD HAPPEN, I ASSUME? 
A. YES. 
Q. BUT DID YOU MAKE ANY HAND GESTURES, ANY STATEMENTS, 
ANYTHING TO SUGGEST THAT THAT'S WHAT — 
A. NO. 
Q. -- YOU WANTED THE DEFENDANT TO DO? 
A. NO. 
MS. BEATON: ALL RIGHT. I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q. OF COURSE YOU — THE FIRST TIME YOU TOLD MS. BEATON 
ABOUT THIS WAS AFTER THE 11TH OF JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, RIGHT? 
A. IS THAT WHEN — WHAT DAY WAS THAT? 
Q. THAT WAS THE DAY THIS — THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS 
HELD, CORRECT? 
A. IF THAT, YEAH — 
Q. WHEN SHE TALKED TO YOU ABOUT THE FACTS FOR THE 
SUPPRESSION MOTION, CORRECT? 
A. WE — WE HAD --WE TALKED BRIEFLY. 
Q. OKAY. AFTER THAT DATE, THOUGH. 
A. I — 
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Q. DID YOU TALK TO HER ON THE PHONE AFTER THAT DATE ABOUT 
WHAT HAPPENED? 
A. SHE TOLD ME THAT IF SHE WASN'T GOING TO NEED ME, SHE 
WOULD CALL ME. SHE DID LEAVE A MESSAGE. 
Q. OKAY. AFTER THAT DATE? 
A. SHE REQUESTED THAT I SUBMIT THE STATE STATUTE ON THE 
BICYCLE. 
Q. OKAY. DID YOU TALK TO HER ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT YOU 
STOPPED THE DEFENDANT, TOO? 
A. WE TALKED ABOUT THE WHOLE THING. 
Q. TALKED ABOUT THE WHOLE THING. OKAY. AND THAT WAS AFTER 
THE 11TH OF JANUARY OF THIS YEAR. 
A. YES. 
Q. OKAY. NOW, IT'S NOT A VIOLATION OF STATE LAW TO RIDE A 
BICYCLE ON THE SIDEWALK, IS IT? 
A. NO. 
Q. AND YOU DON'T HAVE TO HAVE LIGHTS ON A BICYCLE IF YOU'RE 
RIDING ON THE SIDEWALK AFTER DARK, CORRECT? 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY OGDEN CITY STATUTE THAT SAYS THAT? 
A. NO. 
Q. BUT IN YOUR REPORT, YOU SAID YOU STOPPED HIM FOR RIDING 
HIS BIKE ON THE — WITHOUT LIGHTS, CORRECT? 
A. BECAUSE HE CROSSED THROUGH THE INTERSECTION. 
Q. HE CROSSED THROUGH THE INTERSECTION IN A CROSSWALK, 
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CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND ON THE 11TH OF JANUARY, YOU TOLD ME AND MRS. BEATON 
THAT THE LIGHT WAS PROPER, SO HE WASN'T JAYWALKING. 
A. NO, HE WASN'T. 
Q. HE CROSSED LEGALLY IN THE CROSSWALK. 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. AND A PEDESTRIAN DON'T NEED LIGHTS ON TO CROSS LEGALLY 
IN A CROSSWALK AFTER DARK, CORRECT? 
A. NO, SIR. 
Q. FACT, THE STATE STATUTE SAYS A BICYCLE THAT'S ON THE 
SIDEWALK HAS THE SAME RIGHTS AND DUTIES AS A PEDESTRIAN, 
CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. SO HE DIDN'T NEED LIGHTS ON TO CROSS THE CROSSWALK, DID 
HE? 
A. NO. 
Q. YOU'RE SAYING YOU PULLED — WHERE WAS HE AT WHEN YOU 
FIRST SAW HIM? 
A. HE WAS — I SHOULD HAVE MARKED IT. WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO 
POINT? 
Q. YEAH. 
A. OKAY. HE WAS — HE WAS IN THIS AREA RIGHT — RIGHT IN 
HERE. 
Q. OKAY. AND WHERE WERE YOU AT? 
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A. I WAS DRIVING SOUTHBOUND. 
Q. WHERE EXACTLY SOUTHBOUND WERE YOU AT? 
A. I WOULD SAY CROSS — RIGHT HERE NEARING — CLOSING ~ 
GETTING CLOSE TO THE INTERSECTION. 
Q. OKAY. SO AS YOU'RE GOING THROUGH THE INTERSECTION, YOU 
NOTICE THAT HE'S GOING — 
A. NORTH. 
Q. — GOING NORTH AND HE'S CROSSING THE CROSSWALK. 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU IMMEDIATELY FLIP A U-TURN AND PULL IN RIGHT 
BEHIND HIM, CORRECT? 
A. I GO DOWN TO WHERE IT'S SAFE, MAKE A U-TURN, 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
Q. OKAY. THAT ONLY TAKES A FEW SECONDS, RIGHT? HE DOESN'T 
GET VERY FAR NORTHBOUND RIDING HIS EIKE, DOES HE? 
A. WELL, THAT'S — THAT'S ABOUT MAYBE A HUNDRED YARDS. 
Q. OR LESS. 
A. COULD BE LESS, COULD BE MORE. 
Q. BUT THEN YOU PULL IN RIGHT BEHIND HIM, CORRECT? 
A. I PULL IN BEHIND HIM, YES. 
Q. YOU GET OUT- OF YOUR CAR. HE STOPS, LOOKS AROUND, AND 
THE FIRST THING YOU ASK HIM IS IF HE HAD ANY IDENTIFICATION? 
A. YES. 
Q. YOU DIDN'T SAY, COME HERE, CAN I TALK TO YOU? 
A. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD IDENTIFICATION. HE STOPPED ~ 
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Q. THAT'S THE FIR — 
A. I'M SORRY. 
Q. THAT'S THE VERY FIRST THING YOU SAID TO HIM, CORRECT? 
A. HE STOPPED HIS BIKE. I APPROACHED HIM. ASKED HIM IF HE 
HAD SOME IDENTIFICATION. 
Q. OKAY. AND THEN WHEN HE SAID HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY 
IDENTIFICATION, HE SAYS HIS NAME'S VAL TEHERO, CORRECT? 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. AND YOU IMMEDIATELY RAN HIM FOR WARRANTS, CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AT THAT POINT IN TIME, DID YOU HAVE ANY BELIEF THAT HE'S 
INVOLVED IN ANY CRIMINAL ACTIVITY? 
A. AT THAT POINT IN TIME, OTHER THAN CROSSING THROUGH THE 
INTERSECTION. 
Q. WHICH ISN'T A VIOLATION OF THE LAW, THOUGH, RIGHT? 
A. NO. 
Q. SO OTHER THAN THAT, DID YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE 
THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN ANY CRIMINAL ACTIVITY? 
A. NO. 
Q. THEN WHY DID YOU RUN HIS NAME FOR WARRANT? 
A. JUST IF I CONTACT SOMEBODY ON THE STREET, I RUN 'EM, 
CHECK 'EM FOR WARRANTS. 
Q. AND THAT PERSON — YOU NEVER TOLD HIM HE WAS FREE TO GO. 
YOU — IN FACT, YOU ASKED HIM FOR IDENTIFICATION, RIGHT? YOU 
NEVER TOLD HIM WHY — WHY YOU WERE TALKING TO HIM OR EVEN 
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ASKED PERMISSION TO TALK TO HIM, RIGHT? 
A. I DIDN'T SPECIFICALLY ASK, DO YDU MIND IF I TALK TO YOU, 
NO, I DIDN'T SAY THAT. 
Q. YOU DIDN'T ASK HIM ANY PERMISSION. YOU JUST ASKED HIM 
IF HE HAD ANY I.D., THEN RUN HIM FOR WARRANTS, CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU SAY THAT'S JUST STANDARD PROCEDURE, CORRECT? 
A. WELL, IF I -- WHEN I STOPPED HIM, IT WAS FOR THE GOING 
THROUGH THE INTERSECTION. 
Q. BUT THAT WASN'T ILLEGAL, CORRECT? 
A. WELL, NO, IT WASN'T. 
Q. SO LEGALLY, YOU COULDN'T HAVE STOPPED HIM FROM GOING 
THROUGH THE INTERSECTION, CORRECT? 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. AND YOU HAD NO REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT HE WAS INVOLVED 
IN ANY OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, CORRECT? 
A. WELL, OTHER THAN JUST THE GENERAL AREA OF THE CITY THAT 
HE WAS IN AT THAT TIME. 
Q. 1700 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON BOULEVARD, WASHINGTON 
BOULEVARD'S A MAIN ROAD, IT'S 10:30 AT NIGHT. PEOPLE CAN 
WALK UP AND DOWN THE SIDEWALK, CORRECT — 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. — WITHOUT BEING INVOLVED IN ANY CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
A. SURE. 
Q. YOU NEVER SAW HIM DO ANYTHING SUSPICIOUS? 
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A. NOT NECESSARILY SUSPICIOUS. 
Q. IT'S NOT EVEN — IT'S NOT LIKE IT'S THREE O'CLOCK AT 
NIGHT. IT'S 10:30 AT NIGHT ON A — ON A SUMMER NIGHT, 
CORRECT? IT'S NOT UNUSUAL TO SEE PEOPLE WALKING ON 
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD IN THAT AREA AT NIGHT, IS IT? 
A. THERE'S NOT A LOT OF PEOPLE WALKING THAT TIME OF NIGHT, 
NO. 
Q. BUT IS IT UNUSUAL? DO YOU STOP EVERYBODY YOU SEE 
WALKING — 
A. NO, IT'S NOT UNCOMMON. 
Q. DO YOU STOP EVERYBODY YOU SEE RIDING A BIKE OR WALKING 
ON THE SIDEWALKS ON THE 1700 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON BOULEVARD? 
A. NOT EVERY PERSON, NO. 
Q. THEN WHY DID YOU STOP HIM? 
A. LIKE I SAID, WHEN I SAW HIM GO THROUGH THE INTERSECTION. 
Q. OKAY. BUT THAT WASN'T ILLEGAL. 
A. AT THAT TIME, I — WHEN HE — WHEN HE ENTERED THE 
ROADWAY, I KNOW — I KNEW THAT YOU COULD RIDE ON THE 
SIDEWALK, BUT ONCE HE ENTERED THE ROADWAY, I WAS UNDER THE 
IMPRESSION THAT HE NEEDED A LIGHT. 
Q. BUT THAT WAS WRONG, CORRECT? 
A. YES, IT WAS. 
Q. PEOPLE RIDE BIKES ON WASHINGTON ALL THE TIME. DO YOU 
STOP EVERYBODY THAT GOES — CROSSES — 
MS. BEATON: OBJECTION. ASKED AND ANSWERED. 
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MR. GRAVIS 
MS. BEATON 
MR. GRAVIS 
NO, IT'S NOT. 
YEAH IT WAS. 
I'VE NOT FINISHED EVEN. 
THE COURT: WELL, JUST LET'S GET IT ANSWERED AND LAWYERS 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
Q. (BY MR. GRAVIS) DO YOU STOP EVERYBODY WHO CROSSES ACROSS 
A CROSSWALK WITHOUT LIGHTS ON THEIR BIKE? 
A. IF I — IF — UP UNTIL THAT POINT, IF I SAW THEM CROSS 
THE — IF I SAW THEM ENTER THE ROADWAY, YES, THEY'D BE 
STOPPED. 
Q. OKAY. BUT THE — LIKE I SAY, YOU NEVER SAID ANYTHING 
ABOUT WHY YOU STOPPED HIM UNTIL AFTER YOU RAN THE WARRANTS 
CHECK; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. OKAY. AND THE ONLY CONVERSATION YOU HAD WITH HIM IS 
WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD ANY IDENTIFICATION, CORRECT? 
A. IT WAS A VERY BRIEF CONVERSATION. 
Q. AND THAT'S THE ONLY CONVERSATION YOU HAD WITH HIM. 
A. YES. I ASKED HIM FOR I.D. I FAN HIS NAME. 
MR. GRAVIS: OKAY. I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BEATON: 
Q. NOW, AT THE TIME THAT YOU ASKED THE DEFENDANT FOR 
IDENTIFICATION, DID HE GIVE YOU ANYTHING? 
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A. JUST HIS NAME. 
Q. SO HE JUST VERBALLY TOLD WHAT YOU HIS NAME IS. 
A. YES, MA'AM. 
Q. DID YOU EVER ACQUIRE ANYTHING FROM HIM, YOU KNOW, ANY 
KIND OF CARDS OR ANYTHING TO SUPPORT THE FACT THAT THAT WAS 
WHAT HIS NAME WAS? 
A. JUST HIS NAME AND DATE OF BIRTH. 
Q. OKAY. SO OTHER THAN THAT, YOU HAVING A CONVERSTAION 
WITH THE DEFENDANT, YOU DID NOT ACQUIRE ANYTHING BELONGING TO 
THE DEFENDANT. 
A. NO. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AND WHEN WE KEEP USING THIS WORD STOPPED, 
DID YOU ACTUALLY STOP THE DEFENDANT? 
A. NO. I — THERE WAS NO — THERE WAS — IT WAS NOT A 
STOP. IT WAS — 
Q. HE STOPPED, YOU STOPPED — 
A. HE SAW ME PULL IN BEHIND HIM AND HE STOPPED. 
Q. AND YOU WENT OVER TO HIM. 
A. YES. 
Q. OKAY. NOW, JUST SO WE'RE ALL CLEAR, AT THE TIME THAT 
THIS INCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON AUGUST 31ST, 2004, IS IT YOUR 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE 
RIDING HIS BIKE OUT IN THE INTERSECTION WITHOUT A LIGHT 
AFFIXED TO HIS BIKE? 
A. YES, THAT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING. 
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Q. AND DID HE HAVE ANY TYPE OF BIKE — I MEAN DID HE HAVE 
ANY TYPE OF LIGHT AFFIXED TO THIS BIKE? 
A. NO, HE DID NOT. 
Q. DID HE HAVE ANY KIND OF LIGHT AT ALL ON THE BIKE? 
A. NO. 
Q. OKAY. AND THAT WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW AT THE 
TIME. 
A. IT WAS. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. IT WAS. 
MS. BEATON: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q. BUT YOU DIDN'T KNOW WHAT THE LAW WAS, CORRECT? YOU — 
YOU WERE WRONG — 
A. YES. 
Q. — ON YOUR ASSUMPTION. 
A. I WAS. I WAS. 
Q. WHEN DID YOU PREPARE YOUR WRITTEN REPORT? 
A. PROBABLY RIGHT AFTER WE GOT DONE WITH BOOKING HIM INTO 
JAIL. 
Q. SO THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN AUGUST 31ST? 
A. YEAH. YEAH, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. IF — I MEAN IT 
WOULDN'T HAVE FALLEN INTO SEPTEMBER 1ST BECAUSE IT WAS — I 
MEAN THERE WASN'T THAT TIME GAP. 
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Q. AND IN YOUR WRITTEN REPORT, SECOND PARAGRAPH SAYS, I 
STOPPED THE MALE IN THE 1600 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON BOULEVARD, 
CORRECT? 
A. THAT'S WHAT IT — YES, SIR. 
MR. GRAVIS: NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE? 
MS. BEATON: NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. YOU CAN STEP DOWN. ANY OTHER 
WITNESSES? 
MS. BEATON: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: DOES THE DEFENSE PLAN ON PUTTING ANY 
EVIDENCE? 
MR. GRAVIS: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND YOU WANNA RESET THIS FOR ARGUMENT 
THEN? 
MS. BEATON: YES, PLEASE. 
MR. GRAVIS: YEAH. 
THE COURT: AND YOU'RE GONNA FILE SOMETHING. I DON'T 
KNOW WHAT YOUR TIME SCALE IS OR TIME FRAME. 
MS. BEATON: WELL, THE DEFENDANT'S OUT OF CUSTODY. I 
GUESS I'D JUST ASK FOR (UNINTELLIGIBLE) WEEKS. 
THE COURT: OKAY. I'M NOT SURE, I DON'T HAVE MY 
CALENDAR. I DIDN'T KNOW WE WERE GONNA SET ANYTHING, SO IF WE 
CAN JUST GET — WELL, NO. I DON'T THINK WE NEED TO DO THAT 
BUT — OKAY. WHY DIDN'T YOU HAVE IT FILED BY MARCH 8TH THEN. 
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MS. BEATON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: DO YOU WANT TIME TO REPLY? 
MR. GRAVIS: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. COULD YOU HAVE IT BY THE 18TH OF 
MARCH? THAT'S ABOUT TEN DAYS. WHY DON'T WE JUST SET IT ON 
MY LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR FOR APRIL 5TH AT TWO. WILL THAT 
WORK FOR EVERYBODY? 
MR. GRAVIS: THAT'LL BE FINE. 
THE COURT: I DON'T THINK I T ' L L BE AN EXTENSIVE 
ARGUMENT. SHOULD BE - - I MEAN I THINK BY THAT TIME I T ' L L ALL 
BE LAID OUT FAIRLY CLEARLY AND WE'VE HEARD THE EVIDENCE, SO I 
WOULD ANTICIPATE I T ' D BE FAIRLY SHORT ARGUMENT. SO I THINK 
WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO IT ON A REGULAR LAW AND MOTION THEN. 
MS. BEATON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. 
MS. BEATON: THANK YOU. 
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OGDEN, UTAH APRIL 12, 2005 
THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS VAL TEHERO, 41905050. 
MR. ALLEN: THIS IS ON FOR DECISION, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OH, I'M SORRY. IS HE STILL HERE? 
(ANOTHER CASE WAS CALLED.) 
THE COURT: OKAY. RECALL VAL TEHERO. ALL RIGHT. THIS 
IS THE TIME SET FOR DECISION IN THE CASE. I TOOK IT UNDER 
ADVISEMENT AFTER HEARING ORAL — 
MR. ALLEN: CORRECT. 
THE COURT: — ARGUMENT ON ONE DAY AND EVIDENCE ON 
ANOTHER DAY. I'VE DETERMINED TO DENY THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE WAS WHETHER THERE WAS ACTUALLY A STOP, 
A LEVEL TWO SITUATION. IN THIS CASE, ALTHOUGH THE OFFICER 
PULLED UP BEHIND MR. TEHERO, WHO WAS OPERATING HIS BICYCLE AT 
A LATE EVENING HOURS ON THE -- ON THE SIDEWALK, HE DID NOT 
ACTIVATE HIS LIGHTS, HE DIDN'T ACTIVATE HIS SIREN, HE DIDN'T 
TELL THE DEFENDANT TO STOP, HE DIDN'T INDICATE IN ANY WAY 
THAT HE WAS DETAINING THE DEFENDANT. THE DEFENDANT STOPPED, 
ACCORDING TO THE OFFICER'S TESTIMONY, AND IT'S NOT DISPUTED, 
HE STOPPED ON HIS OWN. LOOKED BACK. THE OFFICER THEN ASKED 
HIM WHAT HIS NAME WAS AND ASKED FOR SOME INFORMATION, I 
GUESS. DIDN'T TELL HIM HE COULDN'T LEAVE. AGAIN, DIDN'T — 
THERE WERE NO OTHER OFFICERS ON THE SCENE. AND GRANTED, IT 
WAS FOCUSSED ON THIS DEFENDANT, THERE'S NO QUESTION ABOUT 
THAT, BUT THE ISSUE WAS, WAS HE FREE TO LEAVE. THAT IS THE 
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SOLE ISSUE THAT WAS ARGUED AT THE — BY MR. GRAVIS. 
YOU'RE ACTING LIKE — 
MR. ALLEN: WELL, I — I JUST DON'T — 
THE COURT: — MR. ALLEN, THAT YOU'RE — 
MR. ALLEN: I'M NOT GONNA ARGUE IT BECAUSE I'VE GONE 
THROUGH IT, BUT I — 
THE COURT: YEAH — 
MR. ALLEN: ~ I CAN'T SEE HOW ANYBODY WOULD HAVE FELT 
THAT THEY COULD JUST WALK — 
THE COURT: WELL, THE STATE — 
MR. ALLEN: ~ RIDE OFF ON THEIR BIKE — 
THE COURT: — THE STAN — THE STANDARD IS WOULD A 
REASONABLE PERSON FEEL THAT THEY COULD LEAVE THE SCENE — 
MR. ALLEN: RIGHT, AND I DON'T BELIEVE A SINGLE PERSON 
WOULD HAVE — 
THE COURT: IN THIS SITUATION — I'LL GO OVER IT AGAIN 
SO IT'S CLEAR FOR THE RECORD IN CASE IT GETS APPEALED. THERE 
WAS NO STOP BY THE OFFICER. THE OFFICER DID NOT ACTIVATE HIS 
LIGHTS. HE DIDN'T ACTIVATE HIS SIREN. HE SIMPLY PULLED 
UP — SIREN. HE SIMPLY PULLED UP IN THE AREA BEHIND THE 
DEFENDANT. THE DEFENDANT, APPARENTLY THINKING THAT IT WAS 
DIRECTED AT HIM, STOPPED HIS BICYCLE, COOPERATED WITH THE 
OFFICER WHEN HE ASKED FOR — THE OFFICER ASKED FOR 
INFORMATION. I CAN ONLY SURMISE THAT PERHAPS MR. TEHERO 
STOPPED BECAUSE THERE WAS AN OUTSTANDING WARRANT, HE THOUGHT 
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HE MIGHT BE WANTED ON IT. I CAN'T — I DON'T KNOW. BUT AT 
THAT TIME THE OFFICER DIDN'T TELL HIM THERE'S A WARRANT, 
STOP, YOU'RE UNDER ARREST. DIDN'T INDICATE HE WAS DETAINING 
HIM IN ANY WAY. DID NOT TAKE ANY ITEMS FROM HIS PERSON. 
DIDN'T TAKE HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE, HIS IDENTIFICATION CARD, OR 
ANY OTHER PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE DEFENDANT. AND THE 
DEFENDANT VERY WELL MAY HAVE THOUGHT, WELL, MAYBE I SHOULDN'T 
LEAVE. BUT THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS HE WAS FREE TO LEAVE. 
AND IT WASN'T — A REASONABLE PERSON SHOULD HAVE REALIZED 
THAT THEY WERE FREE TO LEAVE. AS I SAID, MR. TEHERO MAY HAVE 
FELT HE — HE SHOULDN'T LEAVE BECAUSE HE KNEW HE WAS THE ONE 
THAT KNEW HE HAD THE WARRANT OUT, AND HE STAYED. BUT UNDER 
THE CASE LAW THAT'S BEEN CITED, THERE'S ABSO — IF AN OFFICER 
CAN'T STOP OR AT LEAST ASK SOMEBODY QUESTION UNDER THESE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, I THINK WE'RE — WE'VE EXTENDED THE STANDARD 
TO THE POINT WHERE IT SHOULD BE THAT THE OFFICER SIMPLY 
CANNOT STOP ANYBODY AND TALK TO 'EM. AND THAT'S MY OPINION 
OF THE CASE. 
MR. ALLEN: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: YOU KNOW, THERE'S FINE LINES BETWEEN THESE 
SITUATIONS AND, YOU KNOW, I — I THINK AT SOME POINT YOU'VE 
GOTTA SAY THAT THERE IS AT LEAST SOME ROOM FOR A SITUATION 
LIKE THIS TO CONSTITUTE A LEVEL ONE SITUATION. AND I GUESS 
IT'S APPEALABLE SHOULD WE GET TO THAT POINT. LET'S SET IT 
FOR TRIAL. HOW MANY DAYS FOR TRI^L? 
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MS. BEATON: I BELIEVE IT'S MR. GRAVIS — 
MR. ALLEN: IT IS MR. GRAVIS'S CASE. HE'LL NEED — 
MS. BEATON: I ASSUME YOU DON'T HAVE HIS CALENDAR? 
MR. ALLEN: I DON'T. 
THE COURT: JUST SET IT JUNE 15TH AT NINE O'CLOCK FOR 
TRIAL. FINAL PRETRIAL JUNE 7TH AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK. 
MS. BEATON: IF IT DOES GO TO — 
THE COURT: AT TWO O'CLOCK. 
MS. BEATON: — TRIAL, I THINK THAT — I AM THE HANDLING 
ATTORNEY. I THINK IT'S GONNA TAKE TWO DAYS. 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) THE 15TH AND 16TH THEN? 
THE COURT: IT'S GONNA TAKE TWO DAYS FOR THE CASE LIKE 
THIS, YOU THINK? 
MS. BEATON: WELL, I MEAN IF THEY DON'T STIPULATE — I 
HAVEN'T TALKED TO MR. GRAVIS, BUT IF THEY DON'T STIPULATE TO 
THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY ON THE METH AND THE LAB AND THAT KIND OF 
THING, WE HAVE TO BRING IN ALL SORTS OF PEOPLE. 
THE COURT: I MEAN I — I GUESS I'M SURPRISED BECAUSE I 
ACTUALLY HEARD QUITE A BIT OF THE EVIDENCE. I'M JUST — 
WOULD BE VERY SURPRISED THAT IT COULD BE — TAKE THAT LONG, 
BUT OKAY. JULY 5TH AND 6TH. 
MR. ALLEN 
THE COURT 
MR. ALLEN 
THE COURT 
JULY 5TH AND 6TH — 
RIGHT. 
— AS OPPOSED TO THE 15TH? 
WELL, I DON'T HAVE A NEXT DAY, THAT'S THE 
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1 PROBLEM, BECAUSE I'M NOT AVAILABLE THE NEXT DAY, SO — 
2 MR. ALLEN: AND WHEN IS THE PRETRIAL? 
3 THE COURT: PRETRIAL'S ON THE 28TH OF JUNE AT TWO 
4 O'CLOCK. 
5 MR. ALLEN: OF MAY? 
6 THE COURT: JUNE. 
7 MR. ALLEN: OKAY. 
8 MR. BEDDES: TRIAL'S IN JULY. 
9 THE COURT: BUT I GUESS YOU CAN — YOU CAN TAKE IT UP TO 
10 THE COURT OF APPEALS AND MAYBE GET ANOTHER RULING ON WHEN 
11 (UNINTELLIGIBLE) THINGS, HOW FAR THEY EXTEND AND THEY CAN BE 
12 THE FACT FINDER EVEN, IF THEY WANT — 
13I MR. ALLEN: I DON'T THINK THEY'LL DO THAT ON A — THAT 
14 KIND OF A THING. 
15 THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. 
16 MR. ALLEN: ALL RIGHTIE. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
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OPINION 
GRADY. 
*l Michael Cartwright was indicted for 
possessing crack cocaine in violation of R.C. 
2925.11(A). Prior to trial, Cartwright filed 
motions to suppress both statements he 
made to police and drugs that were 
recovered from his person. The trial court 
overruled both motions to suppress 
following a hearing. Thereafter, Cartwright 
entered a no contest plea to the drug 
possession charge and was found guilty by 
the trial court. Cartwright was sentenced to a 
mandatory term of two years imprisonment. 
Cartwright has timely appealed to this 
court, challenging the trial court's denial of 
his motions to suppress. 
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
BASED UPON VIOLATIONS OF 
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS PURSUANT 
TO FOURTH, FIFTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 
THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTIONS 10 AND 14, OF THE OHIO 
CONSTITUTION, AS THE STATE 
FAILED TO PROVE THAT OFFICERS 
ADEQUATELY INFORMED 
APPELLANT nF HIS MIRANDA 
RIGHTS. 
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BASED UPON 
VIOLATIONS OF APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS PURSUANT TO THE 
FOURTH, FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND 
ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10 AND 14, OF 
THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, AS THE 
STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT 
APPELLANT KNOWINGLY, 
INTELLIGENTLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY EXECUTED A 
WAIVER OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. 
In reviewing the trial court's decision on a 
motion to suppress, a court of appeals is 
bound to accept the trial court's findings of 
fact if they are supported by competent, 
credible evidence. State v. Satterwhite 
(1997). 123 Ohio App.3d 322. 704 N.E.2d 
259. After reviewing the transcript of this 
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suppression hearing we conclude that the 
record contains competent, credible 
evidence which supports the trial court's 
findings of fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Upon consideration of the testimony of 
Officer Daly and Ms. Harris, this Court 
finds that the following facts have been 
established by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
On August 23, 1998 Dayton Officer 
Kenneth M. Daly was on duty in a marked 
cruiser and assigned to the "Strike Force," 
the uniform enforcement unit of the 
Narcotics Bureau. At approximately 9:30 
p.m. Daly observed several persons riding 
bicycles in the 1300 block of Edison 
Street, a high drug area. One was an adult, 
Cartwright, and the other were juveniles. It 
was dark; however, there was no 
testimony establishing the time the sun set. 
Daly observed Cartwright ride his bike 
without a headlight northbound across the 
middle of the street in front of an 
oncoming westbound automobile. It 
appeared to Daly that the car almost hit the 
bicycle. Daly observed the juveniles 
likewise riding their bikes in circles in the 
middle of the street. 
Since it appeared to Daly that Cartwright 
had almost been struck by a car, and 
Cartwright appeared to be the adult of the 
group, Daly stopped Cartwright to inform 
him that the bikes were being driven in an 
unsafe manner in violation of city codes. 
*2 When Daly asked for an identification, 
Cartwright provided his name and social 
security number, which Daly then 
conveyed to Officer Phillips. While Daly 
was speaking to Cartwright regarding 
bicycle safety, Phillips entered 
Cartwright's name and social security 
number into the police KDT computer and 
discovered that there was an active capias 
for Cartwright's arrest. 
Pursuant to the capias, Cartwright was 
placed under arrest. During a search 
incident to that arrest, Daly found within 
the waistband of Cartwright's pants a 
plastic baggie containing crack cocaine. 
Using a card provided by the Prosecutor's 
Office, Phillips read to Cartwright his 
Miranda Rights. Cartwright said that he 
understood his rights and agreed to speak 
without an attorney. In response to 
questions posed by Daly, Cartwright said 
that he was employed; that he made his 
income by selling drugs; and that there 
was about half an ounce of crack cocaine 
in the baggie. Daly testified that 
Cartwright was "very polite and 
cooperative and answered all the questions 
I had." 
Trial Court's October 30, 1998, Decision 
Overruling Defendant's Motions to 
Suppress, p. 1-3. 
In arguing that the State failed to prove that 
he was properly advised of all of his 
Miranda rights, Cartwright points out that 
the card which Officer Phillips used to 
advise him of his rights was not read into 
evidence or offered as an exhibit. Moreover, 
Officer Phillips did not testify at the 
suppression hearing, only Officer Daley did. 
While he testified that Officer Phillips had 
advised Cartwright of his Miranda rights, 
Officer Daley did not recite for the record 
the specific rights that Officer Phillips 
explained to Cartwright. Thus, Cartwright 
argues that the State failed to prove that the 
police advised him of his right to remain 
silent, his right to consult an attorney before 
and during questioning, and his right to 
appointed counsel if he could not afford to 
hire his own attorney. Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966\ 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ld.2d 694. 
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In Miranda, supra, the High Court stated: 
M[W]e hold that when an individual is 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived 
of his freedom by the authorities in any 
significant way and is subjected to 
questioning, the privilege against self-
incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural 
safeguards must be employed to protect 
the privilege, * and unless other fully 
effective means are adopted to notify the 
person of his right of silence and to assure 
that the exercise of the right will be 
scrupulously honored, the following 
measures are required. He must be warned 
prior to any questioning that he has the 
right to remain silent, that anything he 
says can be used against him in a court of 
law, that he has the right to the presence of 
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed for him 
prior to any questioning if he so desires. 
Opportunity to exercise these rights must 
be afforded to him throughout the 
interrogation. After such warnings have 
been given, and such opportunity afforded 
him, the individual may knowingly and 
intelligently waive these rights and agree 
to answer questions or make a statement. 
But unless and until such warnings and 
waiver are demonstrated by the 
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained 
as a result of interrogation can be used 
against him 
*3/rf., at47<SM79. 
Miranda did not prescribe any specific 
recitation thai officers must make to t 
prisoner to explain the rights involved. It did 
state that the explanation must be "effective 
and express,", Id, at 473, and that "a heavy 
burden rests on the government to 
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived his privilege against 
self-incrimination and his right to retained or 
appointed counsel." Id., at 384, citing 
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 U.S. 478, 
490, n. 12, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977. 
Nevertheless, in defending against a motion 
to suppress evidence of statements that an 
accused made, the State is only required to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the accused was advised of his rights. 
Colorado v. Connelly (19S6X 479 U.S. 157, 
107 S.Ct. 515,93L.Ed.2d473. 
The term "Miranda warnings" passed into 
common parlance soon after the decision 
came down. Most law enforcement agencies 
provide their officers cards from which to 
read the rights to an accused, as the Dayton 
Police Division has. Some ideologues rail 
against them as an undue burden on police 
or a technicality that favors criminals. 
However, as Justice Souter observed in his 
confirmation testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, police have not found 
them to be a major impediment. Indeed, the 
warnings have been most helpful to them as 
a means of opening the door to interrogation 
that a defendant might otherwise later claim 
was coercive and a violation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights because of the particular 
circumstances involved. 
More to the point, for our purposes the 
question is whether the State met the burden 
imposed on it by Miranda, which is to prove 
that the warnings required by Miranda were 
given. We believe thai Officer Daly's 
testimony satisfied that burden. He stated, 
and the trial court found, that Officer 
Phillips used a card provided by the 
Prosecutor's Office to read Cartwright his 
"Miranda rights." That evidence is sufficient 
to prove that the required warnings were 
given, effectively and expressly. Officer 
Daly was not required to recite the words 
actually used or to offer the card into 
evidence to satisfy the preponderance of the 
evidence standard. 
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In arguing that the State failed to prove a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of his 
Miranda rights, Cartwright emphasizes that 
he did not execute any waiver form and 
police did not explicitly ask him if he was 
willing to waive his rights. 
In order for a waiver of Miranda rights to 
be valid it must be voluntary in the sense it 
is the product of a free, deliberate choice, 
rather than some form of coercion. 
Additionally, the waiver must be knowing in 
the sense that it is being made with a full 
awareness of the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequence of the 
decision to abandon it. Moran v. Bur bine 
(19861 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 
L.Ed.2d 410. While an express written or 
oral waiver is usually strong proof of the 
validity of that waiver, that is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to establish a waiver 
because the question is not one of form but 
rather one of fact. North Carolina v. Butler 
(19791 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755. 60 
L.Ed.2d 286. 
*4 Cartwright was advised of his Miranda 
rights and acknowledged that he understood 
those rights. Cartwright then immediately 
indicated to police that he was willing to 
speak to them without an attorney present, 
and proceeded to cooperatively answer all of 
the questions posed to him. There is no 
evidence to suggest, much less demonstrate, 
that Cartwright did not understand his rights, 
that he was threatened or coerced into 
waiving those rights, or that at anytime 
Cartwright desired to halt the questioning 
and consult with an attorney. 
On the totality of these facts and 
circumstances, we cannot say that the trial 
court erred in concluding that Cartwright 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights. 
The first and second assignments of error 
are overruled. 
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
THROUGH FAILING TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE GAINED FROM A 
SEARCH OF APPELLANT 
CONDUCTED IN VIOLATION OF HIS 
RIGHTS PURSUANT TO THE FOURTH 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE OHIO 
CONSTITUTION. 
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
GAINED AGAINST APPELLANT IN 
VIOLATION OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL 
PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW. 
Cartwright argues that his right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures and 
his right to equal protection of the law were 
violated when police asked him for 
identification and then ran his name and 
social security number through their police 
computer. According to Cartwright, his 
identity was not related to the reason why 
police stopped him, and therefore their 
asking his identity was a mere fishing 
expedition for evidence of other criminal 
activity which exceeded the permissible 
bounds of an otherwise valid investigatory 
stop and detention. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. 
Thus, Cartwright asserts that his arrest was 
illegal and the contraband discovered on his 
person incident to that arrest should be 
suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
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nT2vSi5gaiorjT stop by police, 
which was for the purpose of warning him 
that the manner in which he was operating 
his bicycle upon the public streets violated 
Dayton's city ordinances. The initial Terry 
stop by police is supported by probable 
cause because it was based upon an 
obse i of section 74.06(A) of 
tl ed Code General 
C fuire that a bicyclist 
"i, ,„ t side of the roadway 
a s p - » » : l i t aS , this investigatory 
stop and detention of Cartwright is 
constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment no matter what other 
suspicions, ulterior motives, or subjective 
intent the officers may have had when they 
stopped him. Whrenv. United States 0996), 
517 U.S. 806. 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 
89; Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio 
St.3d3,665N.E.2dl091. 
*5 Once police discovered the active 
outstanding arrest warrant for Cartwright 
they had probable cause to arrest him and 
could then conduct a full search of 
Cartwright's person incident to that lawful 
arrest. United States v. Robinson (1973), 414 
U.S. 218. The real issue is whether it was 
constitutionally permissible for police to ask 
Cartwright for identification and then run 
that information through their police 
computer, which revealed the outstanding 
warrant and Cartwright's arrest. 
Cartwright asserts that requiring him to 
provide identification merely because this 
investigatory stop occurred in a "hot spot for 
illegal drug activity" violates his equal 
protection rights. The evidence does not 
support Cartwright's claim, however, that he 
was asked to identify himself because of the 
physical location of this stop. More 
importantly, the evidence does not 
demonstrate that Cartwright was treated 
differently in that regard than other persons 
similarly situated. Officer Daly testified that 
he asked Cartwright for identification so "I 
knew who I was talking to." It is not 
unreasonable for police to request 
identification from someone whom they 
have lawfully stopped to investigate possible 
criminal activity. 
State v. Frederick (July 22, 1993), 
Montgomery App. No. 13780, unreported. 
The evidence demonstrates that Officer 
Daley merely asked Cartwright for 
identification. There is nothing to suggest 
that Daly demanded compliance with that 
request as a condition of Cartwright's 
release. Therefore, Cartwright voluntarily 
provided his name and social security 
number at Officer Daly's request. Officer 
Phillips checked Cartwright's identity 
through the police computer while Officer 
Daly was discussing Cartwright's violation 
of the bicycle safety ordinance, which is 
what prompted police to stop Cartwright in 
the first place. Clearly, on these particular 
facts and circumstances, the conduct of 
police in checking Cartwright's identity did 
not unduly prolong the duration of this stop 
or vary it from its proper purposes in an 
unreasonable way. Therefore, it was not 
constitutionally unreasonable for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. State v. Chagaris 
(1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 551, 669 N.E.2d 
92. 
The third and fourth assignments of error 
are overruled. 
Conclusion 
Having overruled the assignments of error 
presented, we will affirm the judgment from 
which this appeal was taken. 
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WOLFF, J. and FAIN, J., concur. 
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2000 WL 125930 
(Ohio App. 2 Dist.) 
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